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Abstract
Southern Africa’s electrification is at odds with
United Nations goals to provide modern energy for
all by 2030. Electricity planning, a crucial tool to
optimally match future supply and demand, has
largely focused on minimising costs in southern
Africa, sometimes complemented by a discussion of
a discrete set of environmental scenarios. Political
objectives, although their significance is well docu-
mented, have been overlooked in Southern African
Power Pool (SAPP) quantitative electrification plan-
ning research. This study created a novel geo–refer-
enced, multi–objective linear programming (MOLP)
model that combined continuous cost and carbon
dioxide (CO2) emission minimisation objectives
with the political goal of achieving national electric-
ity self–sufficiency, yielding the optimal trade–off
between these three objectives. It solved the MOLP
for three different political risk scenarios in order to
examine a further political objective. The results
revealed a sharp monetary trade–off between CO2
emission reductions and national electricity
sovereignty objectives in the SAPP. Furthermore,
curtailing international political risks has significant
consequences for trade and the optimal generation
mix. While the optimal size of the frequently recom-
mended Grand Inga dam in the Democratic
Republic of Congo was considerably reduced when
either national electricity sovereignty or political risk
constraints were imposed on the model, solar ener-
gy shares increased significantly in both cases. This
was the case especially when CO2 emissions were
simultaneously curtailed. Increased technological,
institutional and policy–making efforts to implement
solar PV at scale would therefore imply immediate
political and environmental merits for national gov-
ernments in the SAPP, and present a sustainable
development opportunity for the region.
Keywords: multi–criteria optimisation, political risk
analysis, Grand Inga dam, energy security, renew-
able energy
Highlights
• Multi–criteria optimisation of Southern African
Power Pool energy network reveals novel
insights.
• Sharp monetary trade-off between CO2 reduc-
tion and national electricity sovereignty.
• Electricity sovereignty and political risk restric-
tions greatly affect generation mix.
• Solar energy meets electricity sovereignty goals
and decreases political risks.
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1. Introduction
The United Nations (UN) aims to ensure access to
modern energy for all by 2030. Some 630 million
people in sub–Saharan Africa currently do not have
access to electricity (International Energy Agency
2015b). Despite its promising renewable energy
resources, the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)
is no exception. Its electrification rate was 33% in
2012, matching the sub–Saharan Africa average.
World Bank figures suggest that nine out of the
twelve SAPP countries have a rural electrification
rate of under 20% (World Bank 2017).
Robust and multi–criteria electricity planning
has been argued to be a crucial prerequisite in
Africa (Trotter et al. 2017) to help achieve the UN
Sustainable Development Goals. Several previous
studies examined adequate Southern African elec-
tricity supply options to satisfy the growing demand
(Spalding–Fecher et al. 2017; Graeber et al. 2005;
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)
2013; Graeber and Spalding–Fecher 2000; Bowen
et al. 1999; Sparrow and Bowen 2005; Bhagavan
1985; Nziramasanga et al. 2013). These studies
constitute a part of the growing literature on inter-
national African electricity planning optimisation
(Rose et al. 2016; Zeyringer et al. 2015; Ohiare
2015; Ohijeagbon and Ajayi 2015; Gnansounou et
al. 2007; Taliotis et al. 2016; Sanoh et al. 2014;
Taliotis et al. 2014; Trotter 2017). Yet, while this lit-
erature has greatly fostered a better understanding
of optimal future African electricity options, their
underlying optimisation objective functions focused
almost entirely on cost minimisation. Environmen-
tal aspects, where modelled explicitly, were either
analysed qualitatively (Barnard 2014; Resnick et al.
2012), or by constructing a discrete set of environ-
mental scenarios (Spalding–Fecher et al. 2017;
Graeber et al. 2005; IRENA 2013). A continuous
multi–criteria approach with the merit of unfolding
relative shifts between different renewable energy
technologies for different degrees of greenhouse gas
(GHG) restrictions, however, is absent in this litera-
ture. 
What is more, the relevance of political objec-
tives for Southern African electricity expansion
planning is well documented (Davidson and
Mwakasonda 2004; Resnick et al. 2012) but cur-
rently not part of quantitative international electric-
ity network expansion models in the academic liter-
ature. Two political factors are highly salient. First,
national governments wish to achieve high levels of
national electricity self–sufficiency to secure stable
and reliable supply, a topic that has received a
growing recent scholarly attention (Van de Graaf
and Colgan 2017; Hawker et al. 2017; Moore
2017). National electricity sovereignty in the SAPP
is an important issue with regards to the political
dependencies created by high levels of electricity
exports from South Africa to Botswana, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. Current efforts such as Swaziland’s
ambitious renewable energy expansion goals fol-
lowing the 2016 Paris Agreement are likely to be
partly motivated by reducing these dependencies,
which led to the highest electricity tariffs in the
region (African Development Bank 2013). Second,
different levels of institutional weakness and politi-
cal instability in the twelve SAPP countries imply
that different international network designs lead to
greatly differing political risk characteristics of the
network. Large–scale renewable electricity export
projects, such as the Grand Inga hydroelectric plant
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), have
been frequently advertised to power significant
parts of sub–Saharan Africa (Taliotis et al. 2016;
Sanoh et al. 2014; IRENA 2015; Taliotis et al. 2014;
Tshombe et al. 2007). Yet an over–reliance on a
highly volatile country marred by dysfunctional
political institutions and violent conflict with over
eighty armed groups (Stearns and Vogel 2015),
where parts of the already installed Inga capacity
remained idle, appears to be a politically sub–opti-
mal choice.
Novel insights were derived from creating a
multi–objective linear programming (MOLP) opti-
misation model of the SAPP generation and trans-
mission network that simultaneously included GHG
reduction and political electricity sovereignty targets
on a continuous scale in addition to cost minimisa-
tion. The model yielded geo–referenced Pareto–effi-
cient network designs corresponding to the optimal
trade–offs between these three objectives.
Furthermore, three different political risk scenarios
were defined for which the MOLP was solved sepa-
rately. In their recent study, Spalding–Fecher et al.
(2017) concluded that SAPP is likely to experience
a shift from fossil fuels to renewables by 2070, when
only economic criteria are concerned (Spalding–
Fecher et al. 2017). This study explicitly yielded the
political and ecological decision–making prefer-
ences under which such a shift becomes cost–mini-
mal for satisfying new demand in 2030 in Southern
Africa already.
It should be noted that politics further influence
national electrification policy issues such as man-
agement of state–owned enterprises, tariff setting
and subsidy distribution in southern Africa. While
such factors are highly relevant, network designers
cannot influence them significantly. By contrast,
energy security and risks of relying on politically
volatile countries for imports strongly depends on
network design. Therefore, political factors that can-
not be prevented through different network designs
were not included in this study.
Section 2 briefly discusses this study’s methodol-
ogy, which was presented in more detail in supple-
mentary material. Section 3 shows data sources for
all parameters used, followed by the discussion of
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model results in Section 4 and implications in
Section 5. Section 6 closes with a brief conclusion.
2. Methodology
The MOLP model is used to study the network
implications for the optimal trade–offs between
cost, GHG emissions and political sovereignty for
different political risk scenarios. An instance of an
all–pairs shortest–path (APSP) model is solved first
to determine the minimal transmission cost
between any supply and demand node in each
political risk scenario. The exact solution procedure
is detailed in the supplementary information.
2.1 All–pairs shortest–path optimisation
An APSP model determines the minimal distance
between any two vertices in a network (Dijkstra
1959; Dreyfus 1969; Floyd 1962). The result of an
ASAP problem is used to calculate the minimal
transmission cost minTranscostsgd between each
supply node (in supply country s Î S using genera-
tion technology g Î G) and demand node (in
demand country d Î D). The supplementary mate-
rial provides mathematical implementation details. 
A simple network structure is assumed with one
main geo–referenced demand node, representing
the entire country demand for all twelve SAPP
countries. This demand node is assumed to be
located at the country’s capital city, except for in the
case of South Africa, where it is Johannesburg. The
extra costs of transmitting electricity from the main
grid, which naturally runs via the main demand
node, to the rest of the country is accounted for by
using a generic split between industry, urban and
rural demand (IRENA 2013). It further assumes one
geo–referenced supply node per country and pri-
mary energy technology where the domestic poten-
tial for such a country–technology combination is
significantly greater than 0. All demand nodes can
be connected with any neighbouring supply node
and any neighbouring country’s main grid directly,
or with any non–neighbouring supply node with an
international grid that connects all countries
between the supply origin and the demand country.
It is assumed that each supply country has a cer-
tain political risk, PolRisks to create a discrete set of
political risk scenario analyses. If PolRisks is greater
than a defined threshold value k, this country is not
allowed to export electricity, nor are any interna-
tional transmission lines allowed to pass through it.
This allows to analyse the impact of preventing
energy dependence on politically highly risky coun-
tries. It can be implemented by setting parameter
neighbour   = 0 (see the supplementary material)
where start node ra is in a country s where PolRisks
> k for all possible start nodes in the network.
Therefore, neighbour     = neighbour     (k) and con-
sequently minTranscostsgd = minTranscostsgd(k), the
optimal minimal transmission costs depend on the
maximum allowed country–level political risk in the
network.
2.2 Multi–objective linear programming
electricity planning optimisation 
To ensure quick and deterministic solution proper-
ties, the MOLP model used in this study was linear.
It optimally matched supply sites in s Î S supply
countries using g Î G generation technologies with
the new additional demand of d Î D demand coun-
tries arising over t Î T = {t1,..., tter} time periods.
All demand in the baseline time period t0 is sunk
and not included in the planning model. The
model, to keep its linearity, assumes no economies
of scale. The deployable capacity by 2030 is at
most 25% of the total theoretical maximum poten-
tial (Sanoh et al. 2014). The model features three
continuous objectives, namely cost minimisation,
GHG emission minimisation, and national electrici-
ty sovereignty maximisation. Implementation de-
tails can be found in the supplementary information.
3. Data
Table A1 in the supplementary material lists data
sources for all model parameters. The numerical
example includes the SAPP’s twelve countries and
six generation technologies where their primary
energy source is an un–imported resource of south-
ern Africa, namely solar PV, onshore wind, hydro,
geothermal, coal, or oil. As this study is concerned
with a 2030 timeframe, solar thermal was not
included, primarily because cost projections
showed a clear dominance of utility–scale solar PV
over solar thermal in 2030 (IRENA 2013). Of the 72
potential supply nodes, 41 were found to have a
generation potential significantly greater than 0 and
were thus included (IRENA 2013; Buys et al. 2007).
Demand estimates were taken from IRENA
(2013). Other studies found roughly similar
demand developments until 2030 for SAPP overall
(Spalding–Fecher et al. 2017; Merven et al. 2010).
This study was only concerned with new demand
arising from demand growth and retirement of old
power plants (IRENA 2013). The year 2010 was
taken as the baseline; all demand already met in
2010 was not part of the model.
Generation cost for SAPP were taken from
IRENA (2013). The solar PV unit costs assumed
that two thirds of the capacity was deployed at util-
ity scale, and one third on rooftops fitted with bat-
teries capable of one–hour storage to match the
assumed industry–urban–rural demand split
(IRENA 2013). Unit transmission costs were set to
the average of values presented in three different
studies (Sanoh et al. 2014; Milligan 2012; Bahrman
2007). For a generation technology with a capacity
factor of 50%, the resulting levelised system unit
cost was USD 0.02428/kWh and 1000 km distribu-
29 Journal of Energy in Southern Africa  •  Vol 28 No 3 • August 2017
rarb
rarb rarb
- -
tion. This value averaged over different distances
and included different high–voltage DC and AC
configurations. The capacity factors in Table 1 were
used to calculate generation technology specific
unit transmission costs per unit of electricity. These
factors were furthermore used to derive installed
capacity values from the model results. Transmis-
sion costs further included an assumed 3.5% ener-
gy loss per 1000 km of transmission (Sanoh et al.
2014) as well as a price bonus for transmitting elec-
tricity to remote areas using the business–urban–
rural demand split mentioned earlier and associated
costs (IRENA 2013; 2012). 
The CO2 emissions were assumed to be 0 for all
renewable energy technologies and calculated using
standard carbon and energy content values for coal
and oil as well as conversion efficiencies in Table 1,
leading to 882 and 711 tons CO2/GWh of produced
coal and oil electricity, respectively. Much more
detail on the carbon footprint of SAPP electricity
generation has been provided elsewhere (Zhou et
al. 2009).
Solar insulation maps (IRENA 2017) and wind
potential maps (Archer and Jacobson 2005) were
used and the per–country location was assumed to
be where the potentials showed peaks on the coun-
try maps taken from Natural Earth (Natural Earth
2017) in order to geo–reference the supply poten-
tials for all 41 supply nodes. These locations were
taken from the planning literature (Sanoh et al.
2014) for hydro–energy and geothermal energy. 
Table 2 assigns a political risk value to each of
the twelve SAPP countries based on indicators that
quantify country–wide political factors, which were
found to be relevant for African electrification
(Trotter et al. 2017; Trotter 2016; Ahlborg et al.
2015), in order to model the three different political
risk scenarios for which the MOLP model was
solved. In the first scenario, the allowed political risk
of any supply country PolRisks was set to k = 100,
implying that no political risk restrictions were
imposed on electricity transmission. In the second
scenario, k = 80, therefore DRC, the most political-
ly volatile country in the SAPP, was prohibited from
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Table 1: Assumed conversion efficiency and capacity factors.
Technology Conversion Mean capacity Sources
efficiency factora
Solar PV 0.15 0.20 Buys et al. 2007; IRENA 2012; US Energy Information 
Administration 2016
Onshore wind 0.27 0.33 Buys et al. 2007; IRENA 2012; US Energy Information 
Administration 2016
Hydro 0.80 0.56 IRENA 2013; Buys et al. 2007
Geothermal 0.05 0.58 Buys et al. 2007; IRENA 2012
Coal 0.37 0.73 International Energy Agency 2008; US Energy Information 
Administration 2016
Oil 0.36 0.54 International Energy Agency 2008; US Energy Information 
Administration 2016
a Capacity factors for renewable energy technologies depend on resource availability.
Table 2: Political risk values for southern African power pool countries (World Bank 2016).
Country Political instability Corruption Government Average political 
ineffectiveness risk value
DRC 93.6 76.9 83.0 84.5
Zimbabwe 69.6 76.6 76.6 74.3
Angola 58.9 76.6 73.0 69.5
Swaziland 55.2 55.8 64.0 58.3
Tanzania 54.3 61.3 60.9 58.8
Malawi 49.7 60.6 61.5 57.3
Mozambique 45.6 60.7 61.6 56.0
Zambia 42.2 60.5 63.9 55.5
Lesotho 48.4 48.4 57.1 51.3
South Africa 50.2 47.5 41.1 46.2
Namibia 32.6 44.3 47.5 41.5
Botswana 29.8 31.0 40.2 33.7
Note: All values reflect a 10–year average between 2006 and 2015. They were transformed from a –2.5–2.5 scale provided by the
World Bank to a 0–100 scale, where 100 indicates maximum political risk and 0 indicates minimum political risk (World Bank 2016).
exports and intermediary transmission between two
other countries. In the third scenario, k = 60,
Zimbabwe and Angola were added to this restric-
tion. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 discuss the optimal
trade–off results for the unrestricted k = 100 case in
detail. Section 4.3 shows the significant impact that
political risk restrictions have on the generation mix. 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 The cost of environmental sustainability
and national electricity sovereignty
Figure 1 shows all non–dominated solutions of the
MOLP model, the so–called Pareto front, for the
scenario where political risk was not restricted (k =
100). The minimum cumulative system cost
between 2011 and 2030 covering exclusively newly
arising demand in SAPP with no emission and elec-
tricity sovereignty restrictions was USD 370 billion.
This figure is 18% below that reported by IRENA for
the ‘Renewable energy promotion’ scenario for
SAPP for the same timeframe (IRENA 2013), main-
ly because, in contrast to the IRENA study, this
study in its global cost minimum did not restrict fos-
sil fuel shares and assign costs to GHG emissions,
but modelled their minimisation as a separate
objective, and allowed higher levels of trade. 
The results show that increasing the minimum
level of electricity sovereignty in the SAPP was com-
parably cheap if no CO2 emission restrictions were
applied at the same time. Increasing the cumulative
system costs between 2011 and 2030 by 2.6%
allowed all SAPP demand to be met domestically.
Mitigating CO2 entirely was considerably more
expensive, requiring an increase of 13.3% of cumu-
lative system cost. Figure 2 shows the optimal
domestic electricity share for the MOLP model with
k = 100. The elimination of CO2 emissions was
done most cost–effectively by significantly increas-
ing the overall international trade levels, mainly
driven by South Africa substituting its reliance on
coal with hydroelectric imports from DRC, as well
as from other domestic and neighbouring renew-
able sources. Section 4.2 gives more details. 
The simultaneous decrease of GHG emissions
and increase of national electricity sovereignty con-
stitutes a sharp trade–off, reflected in an exponen-
tial increase in cumulative system costs. If 50% of
the maximum CO2 emissions were allowed and
50% national electricity sovereignty were required,
the cumulative system costs increased slightly by
2.0%. If only 25% of the maximum CO2 emissions
were allowed and 75% electricity self–sufficiency
was required, the cost increased by 9.0%. In the
fully restricted case, finally, the minimum cumula-
tive system costs were USD 535 billion, or 44.7%,
higher than the cost minimum. 
4.2 Network effects of emission and
electricity sovereignty optimisation
Figures 3, 4 and 5 illustrate the non–dominated
generation technology mix for different levels of
required national electricity sovereignty of allowed
CO2 emissions and a joint restriction of the two,
respectively. Figure 6 provides the resulting electric-
ity consumption mix of the twelve SAPP countries
and the power pool as a whole for four extreme sce-
narios, Table A2 in the supplementary material lists
all the related optimal capacity additions for all
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Figure 1: Pareto front of non–dominated solutions for different cost, emissions and 
energy sovereignty tuples.
countries. Figures 7 and 8 show the associated geo–
referenced non–dominated SAPP network configu-
rations using QGIS software. These results again do
not assume a restriction of supply country–inherent
political risk, i.e., k = 100. 
The cost–minimal solution obtained without
CO2 and import restrictions is close to the solution
provided in other SAPP planning literature
(Spalding–Fecher et al. 2017; IRENA 2013).
Between 2011 and 2030, almost 34.0 GW of new
coal capacity additions were required, followed by
21.2 GW of hydroelectric capacity additions. In
addition, the model added 1.4 GW geothermal
capacity, while other technologies played a subordi-
nate role. This generation mix, however, changed
considerably depending on which additional opti-
misation criteria were added to the model.
Figure 3 shows that increasing the required level
of electricity sovereignty had comparably small
effects on the optimal electricity mix for the whole
SAPP region when CO2 emissions were not con-
strained. The overall dominance of coal did not
change with higher required national electricity
sovereignty, as South Africa continued to use
domestic coal to meet its demand. Yet the optimal
electricity mix was significantly impacted for several
countries. In Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zim-
babwe and Swaziland, the hydro share dramatically
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Figure 2: Export share as function of emissions and energy sovereignty.
Figure 3: Optimal Southern African Power Pool generation mix for different required electricity
sovereignty levels (no CO2 restrictions).
decreased with increasing national electricity self–
sufficiency requirements in the former four coun-
tries because of domestic replacement of DRC
Grand Inga imports. In the latter case, this was
attributable to missing hydro imports from
Mozambique. Instead, these countries used domes-
tic coal, wind, geothermal, and, finally, solar poten-
tials to compensate for hydro imports. Angola grad-
ually replaced its hydro imports from the DRC with
domestic hydro. Furthermore, Botswana and
Malawi received geothermal energy in the uncon-
strained cost–minimal solution from Namibia and
Zambia, respectively, because of the respective geo-
graphic proximity between geothermal supply loca-
tion and demand. Moving to greater electricity
sovereignty levels, Botswana and Malawi replaced
these geothermal imports with domestic wind and
solar energy, as shown in Figures 6, 7a and 7b. 
As soon as CO2 emissions were restricted, which
translates linearly to introducing increasing CO2
unit emission taxes, the non–dominated generation
mix changed significantly (Figure 4). Its main driver
was South Africa’s need to replace its coal reliance
with renewable energies. Where electricity
sovereignty was not restricted, South Africa now
sourced considerable amounts of its electricity from
DRC’s Grand Inga hydro dam. If CO2 emissions
were restricted by 50% of the maximum possible
value in each country and no restrictions were
placed on imports, South Africa imported 43.2% of
its newly arising electricity demand between 2011
and 2030 from the DRC. If CO2 emissions were
entirely prohibited, South Africa sourced 50.8% of
its additional demand from the DRC in 2030, 8.5%
from hydro in Angola, 2.7% from hydro and wind
sources in Zimbabwe as well as 2.6% from hydro in
Mozambique, as shown in Figure 7c. In this case,
Grand Inga in DRC would need to be operational
at close to its full estimated potential, requiring
39 GW in 2030. Although technologically feasible,
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Figure 4: Optimal Southern African Power Pool generation mix for different allowed CO2 emission
levels (no trade restrictions).
Figure 5: Optimal Southern African Power Pool generation mix for sets of different maximum CO2
emission and required electricity sovereignty levels.
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Figure 6: Optimal country generation mix for different optimisation scenarios 
(% of consumed electricity by source).
this represents a highly challenging implementation
prospect. In general, the move towards zero extra
carbon emissions was cost–minimally achieved by
increasing hydro capacities as well as a consider-
able share of domestic solar PV in Botswana,
Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa. 
If SAPP countries value a certain degree of elec-
tricity sovereignty, while also wanting to decrease
CO2 emissions (Figure 5), it would become infeasi-
ble for South Africa to source hydroelectric energy
from the DRC. Rather, it significantly extended its
solar PV capacities to meet new demand between
2011 and 2030. In a hybrid scenario with CO2 and
import restrictions of 50% of their respective maxi-
mum values, South Africa met 45.9% of its newly
arising electricity demand in 2030 through imports
from DRC, therefore, not needing to build any solar
PV capacity, as shown in Figure 8. As the import
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Figure 7: Optimal Southern African Power Pool network for 2030 for different CO2 emission and
sovereignty values, where (a) = no restrictions, (b) = no imports allowed, (c) = no CO2 emissions
allowed, and (d) = no imports and CO2 emissions allowed.
restrictions increased, however, South Africa gradu-
ally added more domestic solar PV to meet the CO2
restriction. In the extreme scenario of full electricity
sovereignty with zero carbon emissions allowed to
serve additional demand, South Africa would be
required to build 120 GW of domestic solar PV by
2030 in the cost–minimal solution. South Africa’s
significant expansion as well as significant additions
in Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe made
solar PV the dominant source of newly installed
capacities in SAPP between 2011 and 2030 in this
scenario, as shown in Figures 6 and 7d. The
required solar PV additions again constitute a tech-
nologically feasible order of magnitude. China in
2015 added 2.5 times the solar PV capacity that
would be required annually for South Africa to
reach 120 GW by 2030 (International Energy
Agency 2015a). Twelve different materials for solar
PV cells are abundant enough on the planet to build
solar PV cells that meet the entire worldwide
demand, nine of which may be cheaper than the
currently used crystalline silicon (Wadia et al.
2009). Yet such a goal would be a huge challenge
given its financial implications as well as doubts of
utility Eskom’s willingness to allow independent
solar PV implementation in South Africa (Ting
2017). 
The different optimisation scenarios had consid-
erable implications for the optimal size of the Grand
Inga dam in DRC by 2030. Figure 9 shows that its
size varied from 39 GW in situations where the CO2
restriction was strict and electricity sovereignty
played almost no role to slightly over 5 GW where
trade was entirely prohibited and Grand Inga only
served national DRC demand. In the cost–minimal
solution without CO2 and import restrictions, Grand
Inga had a capacity of 16.8 GW by 2030 and pro-
duced 79 TWh electricity per year, where 27% was
exported to Zambia, 17% to Angola, 14% to
Tanzania, 4% to Zimbabwe and 2% to Namibia.
The more CO2 restrictions increased, the higher the
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Figure 8: Cost–optimal network for 50% CO2
and 50% electricity sovereignty restriction
Figure 9: Optimal capacity of Grand Inga in 2030 for different optimisation scenarios with
unconstrained political risk.
share of Grand Inga’s electricity that was exported
to South Africa.
The resulting implications support other
research, which found that relying on Grand Inga
meant giving up energy sovereignty of many SAPP
countries (Sparrow and Bowen 2005). An impor-
tant implication of this is that a significant amount
of political risk in the network was pooled in the
politically most poorly performing country in the
SAPP, as shown in Section 3. To study the effect of
restricting such political risk in the network, Section
4.3 discusses the results when exports from highly
politically risky countries were prohibited.
4.3 Impact of restricting political risks
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the political risk of the net-
work (other than that arising from low electricity
sovereignty values and high CO2 emissions) was
not constrained. This section discusses two alterna-
tive scenarios where political risks, as defined in
Sections 2 and 3, were restricted in the network. In
the first alternative scenario, ScenPR80, political
risk was curtailed by prohibiting countries with a
political risk value of PolRisks > k = 80 from elec-
tricity exports and from featuring intermediary
transmission lines that connect supply and demand
nodes in other countries, as presented in Table 2. In
the second scenario, ScenPR60, this value was fur-
ther reduced to k = 60. The first scenario affected
the DRC; in the second scenario, Angola and
Zimbabwe were added. Figures 10 and 11 present
the non–dominated trade–offs between cost, CO2
emissions and electricity sovereignty for both sce-
narios. Figure 12 shows the implications of restrict-
ing CO2 emissions on optimal generation mix for
ScenPR80 (the results for ScenPR60 were similar).
Figure 13 depicts the optimal network for
ScenPR80 and ScenPR60 when CO2 emissions
were not and were fully restricted.
In both scenarios, trade was severely impacted
as its main source, the Grand Inga dam, was only
active domestically. In the cost–optimal solution of
ScenPR80 with no CO2 or electricity sovereignty
restrictions, instead of relying on DRC imports,
Angola developed significant domestic hydro
capacity to meet its own supply and to export to
Zambia and Namibia. Furthermore, Zambia, Tan-
zania and Zimbabwe developed their wind poten-
tial. In ScenPR60, Angola’s hydro exports were
replaced by Namibian hydro, wind and geothermal
capacity increased, as did hydro exports from
Mozambique. 
Requiring electricity sovereignty to be high had
only a minor cost effect on the optimal network,
because of the added trade restrictions in both sce-
narios. When CO2 emissions were restricted, how-
ever, the generation mix changed significantly
towards solar PV, as shown in Figure 12. This was
the case for both ScenPR80 and ScenPR60. As
soon as hydro imports from DRC were an infeasible
option for South Africa to drive down CO2 emis-
sions, the cost–minimal solution to mitigate CO2 in
2030 was considerable domestic solar PV capacity
additions. Other cheap renewable sources in South
Africa or other SAPP countries were either too small
or too expensive to meet the full South African
demand. In ScenPR80, South Africa, therefore,
installed a maximum of 110 GW of solar PV by
2030 (if CO2 emissions were entirely prohibited) to
replace its domestic coal usage in addition to sourc-
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Figure 10: Pareto front for political risk < 80.
ing smaller amounts of renewable energy from
Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho,
as shown in Figure 13b. 
There were some notable country–scale implica-
tions in the ScenPR60 scenario (Figure 13). As the
model prohibited intermediary transmission
through a country with a political risk value greater
than 60, the transmission line from Namibia to
Zambia was bent to avoid going through Angola.
Similarly, transmission lines from Mozambique to
Zambia and from Botswana to Zambia were bent to
avoid passing through Zimbabwe. Such a network
design, while implying higher transmission costs,
averted the added complexity of including more
politically risky countries into a bilateral electricity
agreement. When CO2 restrictions were applied to
ScenPR60, several renewable resources in countries
bordering South Africa were used for export and
Zambia was forced to considerably scale up its
domestic solar PV capacity, as shown in Figure 13d.
5. Implications
There are a number of implications arising from this
study. First, while relatively cheaply realisable indi-
vidually, achieving national electricity self–sufficien-
cy and no new CO2 emissions simultaneously
implies a significant system cost increase of 44.7%.
Thus, CO2 emission reductions and national elec-
tricity sovereignty constitute two objectives with
comparably small synergies and a sharp monetary
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Figure 11: Pareto front for political risk < 60.
Figure 12: Optimal Southern African Power Pool generation mix at different allowed 
CO2 emission levels for political risk < 80.
trade–off in the SAPP. The strict monetary trade–off
between climate change mitigation and national
energy sovereignty requires well–defined prefer-
ences of decision makers to select a feasible future
generation mix for the region.
Second, if each country is restricted to 55% of its
theoretical maximum CO2 emissions in 2030,
hydro becomes the dominant generation source of
meeting demand arising between 2011 and 2030.
However, if countries value a certain degree of
national electricity sovereignty, they gradually
replace large–scale hydro imports from DRC, as
well as from Angola, Mozambique and Zambia,
with domestic wind and solar sources in the opti-
mum solution. When both CO2 emissions and for-
eign electricity dependence are curtailed at 25% of
their respective maximum values, solar PV becomes
the dominant generation source for meeting
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Figure 13: Optimal Southern African Power Pool network for different CO2 emission and
sovereignty values, where (a) = political risk < 80, no other restrictions, (b) = political risk < 80, no
CO2 emissions allowed, (c) = political risk < 60, no other restrictions, and (d) = political risk < 60, no
CO2 emissions allowed.
demand arising between 2011 and 2030. This is
mainly driven by South Africa’s need to develop
significant domestic solar PV capacities under these
circumstances, but also by solar PV additions in
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. If South Africa intends to
keep its reputation as the region’s dominant power-
house and also reduce its carbon footprint signifi-
cantly, it needs to quickly scale–up domestic solar
energy. An approach that actively includes both
Eskom and independent power producers seems
most promising given the required scale. Solar PV
in the SAPP today presents a unanimously agreed–
upon market opportunity with significant foresee-
able demand. With the right policy incentives, such
as adequate carbon taxes and costing political risks,
this move towards solar would be cost–optimal
much earlier than in 50 years. To decrease the cost
and required scale of this energy transition, both
supply–side measures surrounding energy efficien-
cy increases and logistical challenges, and demand–
side management to decrease industrial and resi-
dential demand need to be stepped up, especially
where a business case exists to do so. 
Third, when political risk values are restricted,
DRC’s hydro exports become infeasible due to the
country’s volatile political nature. As a result, in the
cost–optimal solution for cases where CO2 emis-
sions are restricted to at most 35% of their theoreti-
cal per–country maximum, solar PV becomes the
dominant generation source for serving the newly
arising demand between 2011 and 2030 in SAPP.
This is the case whether or not decision–makers
value national electricity sovereignty. Equivalently,
higher solar PV shares manage to reduce the politi-
cal risk in the SAPP network. In turn, this result
implies that despite its obvious cost–effectiveness
and large–scale climate change mitigation potential,
a number of institutional and political stability con-
siderations need to be addressed before developing
DRC’s Grand Inga at scale. While scaling solar PV
is a considerable challenge, such a move also pre-
sents technological opportunities. Switching
towards solar PV sooner than later carries the ben-
efit of not having to re–design a whole fossil–fuel
based electricity system when solar PV is fully cost–
competitive in the future. Rather than constructing
a grid designed solely for large–scale projects, it
seems worthy to think about grid architectures and
storage systems capable of dealing with large–scale
centralised and decentralised solar energy today.
Furthermore, research into alternative materials for
solar PV and batteries should be further fostered
which would considerably boost capabilities for
supplying the necessary amount of solar PV cells
long–term. 
It should be noted that the implications of this
multi–criteria study could be refined further if future
research would improve the geospatial optimisation
model to include more concrete site selection within
SAPP countries. Methodologically, the model per-
formance could be compared to evolutionary algo-
rithms, for instance multi–objective particle swarm
optimisations and reactive search optimisation,
which may enable solving bigger models with finer
geospatial resolution necessary to incorporate more
specific site selection problems.
6. Conclusion
This study examined optimal trade–offs between
system cost, CO2 emissions and electricity
sovereignty in the SAPP generation and transmis-
sion network for the demand between 2011 and
2030 for different political risk scenarios. The study
found a number of novel implications for the SAPP
network when political factors are added to eco-
nomic and environmental objectives. These includ-
ed the swift monetary trade–off between CO2 emis-
sions and electricity sovereignty, as well as the
growing share of solar PV capacity in the optimal
solution as environmental and political factors are
taken into consideration. The multi–criteria nature
of the SAPP energy–planning problem thus war-
rants an increase of technological, regulatory and
policy–making efforts to enable large–scale deploy-
ment of solar PV in the coming decade, thereby cre-
ating a significant domestic development opportu-
nity.
Note
1. Supplementary data associated with this article can
be found at http://journals.assaf.org.za/jesa/rt/
suppFiles/2451/0.
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